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In the progress towards a comprehensive system of administrative law withering
fire has been directed at the doctrine of locus standi as traditionally expounded.
The dichotomy forged by the civil law between public and private rights, the
former belonging to, and finding their protection in, the Crown as parens patriae,
and the laner belonging to the right-holder, is simplistic and inadequate in a
pluralistic society in which there exist "numerous groups, communities and
collectivities" 1 between the individual and the State. A system which regards a
remedy as a correlative of a right or interest is somewhat paradoxical; for in public
interest litigation the court is expected to have regard to, and to protect, the public
interest, but must do so at the instance of an individual affected in his private
capacity. Applied most strictly, this tends to undermine the rule oflaw since, if no
suitably qualified challenger will present himself as plaintiff, the unlawful conduct
of the' defendant may continue without a remedy.2 Moreover, administrative law
has developed somewhat illogically to a point at which it cannot protect the
meritorious but unqualified litigant in cases such as Gouriet v. Union of Post Office
Workers,3 but it can offer protection to the unmeritorious litigant affected by an
administrative decision which is vitiated by procedural defccts.4
No-one has recognised the deficiencies of the traditional system more than
Lord Denning whose work in this field is well recorded. For him there could be no
barrier raised against the individual who' brought a bonafide complaint to the notice
of the court. An individual with a prima facie case could overcome the threshold
issue. For example; in R. v. Paddington Valuation-Officer, ex p. Peachey Property
Corporation Ltd. 5 he statcd:
"Of the School of Law, University of Buckingham.
\. Capalletti, "Vindicating the Public Interest through the Courts: A Comparativist's Contribution",
Access to Justice 3 (1979) 514, 52\. See, e.g., the Sierra Club in Sierra Club v. Monoll 405 U.S. 727
(1972),
2. COl/riet v. l!nion oJPost Office Worker.; [1978] A.C. 435 provides an example in which this may have
been the case.
3. Supra n.2.
4. In cases where there has been a failure of natural justice an unmeritorious applicant may still be
granted relief: Ridge v. Baldwin [1964] A.C. 40. See also, per Lord Denning, in Annamll/llhodo v.
Oi/fields Worker.;' Trade Union [1961] A.C. 945, 956.
5. [1966] I QB. 380, 400.
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"I do not think grievances are to be measured in pounds, shillings and pence.
If a ratepayer or other person finds his name included in a valuation list which is
invalid, he is entitled to come to court to have it quashed. He is not to be put
off by the plea that he has suffered no damage." (Emphasis supplied)
Hence Mr Blackburn, whose injury was fundamentally no greater than that of
the community at large, may have had standing to challenge the prosecution policy
of the Metropolitan police6 and, later, the unlawful manner in which the Greater
London Council was exercising its powers of film censorship;7 and Mr McWhirter
had his day in court to challenge the proposed broadcasting of an allegedly
pornographic film notwithstanding that the Attorney-General had refused his fiat
to relator proceedings.8 As is well known, the House of Lords adhered to a more
traditional exposition of the standing rules; 9 but there are clear signs that,
following the introduction ofR.S.C. Order 53, a less restrictive approach has been
adopted based on the "sufficient interest" formula.lo
It is striking that, whilst Lord Denning was engaged in re-fashioning English
law, similar developments could be traced in other common law jurisdictions and,
in particular, the United States. The expansion of the law of standing in Federal
law has largely been the work of the Supreme Court. Arguably, this trend reached
its zenith in Us. v. SCRAP,II after which concern was expressed that further
progress would allow the judiciary, almost by self-invitation, to step beyond the
jurisdiction to which it is confined by Art. III of the Federal Constitution. This
notwithstanding, there exists a line of authority which places a fundamental
reinterpretation upon Art. III thereby posing new questions touching upon the
proper role of the courts in the settlement of disputes. The resulting tensions in
the law are not dissimilar to those which sparked between the Court of Appeal and
the House of Lords whilst Lord Denning held office as Master of the Rolls.
Developments in the federal C0urts constitute a most valuable study, and the
purpose of the present article is to examine and evaluate these as an instructive
approach to similar problems which have faced our own courts.
It will be shown how, in Federal law, the law of standing developed away from a
'strict legal rights' theory to one where access to court was based primarily upon
the challenger having suffered some "injury in fact"; how that formula was
expanded to the point where "any identifiable trifle" could suffice to generate locus
standi; how subsequently the concept of "injury in fact" was limited by the
adoption of strict rules requiring that the "injury" be sufficiently proximate to the
action challenged; how, in spite of the recent narrowing of the standing concept,
6. [1968] 2 QB. 118.
7. R. v. Greater London Council, ex p. Blackbunl [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550.
8. R. v. Independmt Broadcasting Authon'ty, ex P. McWhirter [1973] QB. 629.
9. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, supra n.2.
10. I.R.C. v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses Lid. [1982] A.C. 617; R. v.
Hammersmith f5 Fulham Borough COUl/cil,ex p. People beforeProfit [1981] ].P.L. 869.
11. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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there remains a line of authority which holds that rules of standing based upon the
self-interest of the litigants in the outcome of the litigation are not strictly
warranted by Art. III of the Federal Constitution; and how it is that in certain
circumstances any plaintiff may have access to court notwithstanding his own lack
of interest in the outcome, provided that the court, on hearing him, can be assured
that he will present every view which would have been advanced had the
right-holders themselves been before the court. It is not impossible that, at some
future date, the abandonment of the traditional "injury-standing" philosophy will
be based on an expansion of this line of authority.
Standing in the U.S. Federal Courts
Article III of the United States Constitution places a fundamental limitation upon
the competence of the Federal courts: their jurisdiction is limited to "cases" or
"controversies".12 It has been stated that this rests upon "a single basic idea - the
idea of separation of powers." 13 The orthodox interpretation of Art. III is that it
requires a live dispute between self-interested parties.14 It follows that the courts
have never pronounced upon "abstract", "conjectural" or "hypothetical" issues; 15
for example the Supreme Court has declined to advise the Executive on the
"construction of treaties, law of nations, and the laws of the United States.,,16 Art.
III has been held to prohibit both the litigation of third-party rights,17 and
12. Article III, Section 2
1. The judicial power shall extend to all cases, in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the
laws of the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, under their authority; to all cases
affecting ambassadors, other public ministers, and consuls; to all cases of admiralty and maritime
jurisdiction; to controversies between two or more States; between a State and citizens of another
State; between citizens of different States; between citizens of the same State claiming lands under
grants of different States, and between a State, or the citizens thereof, and foreign States, citizens or
subjects.
13. AI/en v. Wright 104 S.Ct. 3315, 3325 (1984) per Justice O'Connor delivering the judgment of the
Supreme Court.
14. If the plaintiffs claim is settled, or he loses his interest in the matter, after the filing of the action, he
will lose a legally cognizable interest in the matter which is then "mooted". The courts will generally
decline to rule on a matter which has been "mooted", unless the facts are "capable of repetition, yet
evading review" in a similar matter. For example, if the plaintiffs interest in the matter is that she is
pregnant and denied an abortion by virtue of State laws which she alleges are unconstitutional, she
would lose her interest upon the birth of the child. If the court held that her claim were "mooted" by
the birth of the child it would effectively deny the plaintiff all chance of appellate review of her case. In
the normal process an appeal could not be heard within the normal gestation period of 266 days. Thus,
a strict application of the "mootness" doctrine would effectively deny her, and every other pregnant
challenger, the opportunity to contest the constitutionality of the statute on appeal with the result that
the constirutionality of the statute would always evade review in the superior courts: see Roe v. Wade 41 0
U.S. 113, 125 (1975).
15. Allen v. Wright, supra n.13.
16. Twenty-nine questions concerning the construction of a pending treaty were submitted to the
Supreme Court for its opinion by President Washington in 1793. The Court declined to consider the
matter since no live dispute within Art. 1Il was involved. The matter, in the absence of a "case" or
"controversy", was merely advisory and outside the function of the judicial branch of the State.
17. Tilestoll v. Ulima II 318 U.S. 44 (1943). But this seems to admit of exceptions: see Singleton v. Wulff
966 S.Ct. 2868 (1976).
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generalized grievances.18 The requirement that the plaintiff should demonstrate a
"personal stake in the proceedings,,19 is seen as a "core component" of Art. III
and derives "directly from the Constitution."zo Although Art. III is not explicit
about the nature of the interest which the plaintiff must demonstrate in the
proceedings, and indeed is silent as to whether or not any interest need be shown,
nonetheless the courts have felt able to require that an interest must be
demonstrated by the litigant and to determine the nature of that interest having
regard to the policy function of the law of standing and prevailing social attitudes.
Originally, the "cases" or "controversies" principle was construed so as to limit
the judicial role to the settlement of private disputes. Judicial control of
administrative action could only proceed at the instance of an individual directly
affected in his private legal rights. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. Tennessee Valley
Authority is a leading decision in which the "legal interest" test was advanced. It
was there held that standing pre-supposed " ... that the right invaded is a legal
right. One of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against tortious
invasion, or one founded on statute which confers a privilege.,,21
Fundamentally, the "legal interest" test denied the individual any protection of
non-economic values, the aesthetic, conservational and recreationa1.22 It also.
limited the scope for potential challenge to what would generally be a small class of
persons affected in their legal rights. The supposed justification for such a rule
was that it prevented a multitude of claims arising out of one unlawful act23 and yet
would ensure the vindication of the rule of law because the greatest incentive to
challenge unlawful conduct lay with those economically affected.
However, experience in the United States demonstrated that the fear of judicial
inundation could not, by itself, justifY continued adherence to such a narrow
standing formula as the "legal interest" test. Individuals do not trifle with the
courts. In recognition of this, and in the limited context of the Michigan
Environmental Protection Act 1970, the standing barrier was removed since it was
felt that if anti-pollution controls were to be effective the private individual must
have a central role in the enforcement of the legislation. The Act enabled any
individual to bring proceedings against anyone else to ensure the protection of the
air, water, and natural resources of the State. Significantly, Michigan is highly
18. Schlesinger v. Reservists to Stop the War 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
19. Baker v. Carr 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
20. Per O'Connor]. inAllen v. Wright, supra n.l3. See per Bark]. (concurring) in VanderJagt v. O'Neil
699 F. 2d. 1166, 1178-1179: "All of the doctrines that cluster about Art. III - not only standing, but
moomess, ripenness, politica] question and the like - relate in part.. to an idea which is more than an
intuition, but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and prudential limits to
the powers of an unelected judiciary in our kind of government."
21. 306 U.S. 118, ]37-]38 (1938).
22. In Association of Data Processingv. Camp 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970), the Supreme Court emphasized
that standing could be based upon <\ threat to these kinds of interests as well as economic loss.
23. This was a policywhich was, perhaps, imported into Federal law from England. An early statement
appears in William's Case, 5 Co. Rep. 72b, 73a.
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industrialized with extensive mining and manufacturing undertakings within its
boundaries, especially around Detroit, all of which could pollute four of the five
Great Lakes which lie within the State. However, the courts were not swamped
with claims. In the years following the introduction of the Act, and notwithstanding
the immense potential for litigation, only a comparatively small number of claims
were brought under it each year.24 The clear lesson was that the restrictive
doctrine of standing could not be justified as a protection for the courts from
numerous claims arising out of a single unlawful act. 25 The Supreme Court
responded by abandoning the "legal interest" test in favour of a more extensive
standing formula. In Association of Data Processing v. CampZ6 it was held that access
to Federal courts would be available to a plaintiff who could demonstrate that:
". .. the challenged action has caused him injury in fact, economic or
otherwise. ,,27
and additionally that:
" ... the interest sought to be protected is arguably within the zone of interest
to be protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional guarantee in
question. ,,28
A bi-partite test for standing was thereby introduced. Further developments in
the law of standing were founded upon the first limb of the test which confirmed
the view that standing must depend upon some personal "stake" in the outcome of
the litigation.29 This only begged the further question as to what kinds of interest
would be sufficient. The second limb of the test was more enigmatic. It is
proposed now to consider how the Federal courts applied the injury-standing limb
of the test; secondly to examine the meaning and value of the "zone of interests"
part of the test; and then to consider the most recent developments which have
been designed to set new jurisdictional limits through an insistence that the injury
complained of must not be too remote from the illegal conduct of the defendant.
Injury in Fact
It has been stated that "injury in fact" requires only that the plaintiff show that he
has suffered some harm as a result of the defendant's allegedly unlawful
conduct.3o The Supreme Court has confirmed this view by expressing approval of
Davis' conclusion3! that any identifiable, even though only trifling, loss would
satisfY the new standing formula.32 Naturally, according to this liberal
24. Approximately twenty fivecases each year in the years immediately followingthe enactment of this
provision.
25. Moreover the Supreme Court reasoned that the "legal interest" test was circular: "The legal
interest test goes to the merits. The question of standing is different .. ": 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
26. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
27. Ibid., at p. 152.
28. Ibid., at p. 153.
29. Supra n. 19.
30. Vining, Legal Identity, at p. 29.
31. "Standing: Taxpayers and Others:', 35 U. Chicago L. Rev. 601, 603 (1968).
32. u.s. v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
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interpretation, a variety of non-economic injuries will suffice,33 but it has been
held that neither the possible risk of future injury,34 nor the mere exposure of the
plaintiff to unlawful action without consequent loss will generate standing.35
The extent to which the "injury in fact" test had broadened the categories of
individual entitled to come to court is demonstrated in the SCRAP case,36 which
illustrates the willingness of the Supreme Court at that time to explore the very
limits of the Art. III "cases" or "controversies" principle. SCRAP, the plaintiffs in
this case, challenged a decision of the Inter-State Commerce Commission
(LC.C.) to impose a surcharge on railway freight. It was argued that this would
augment reliance on non-recyclable goods which, in tum, would cause litter in the
Washington Metropolitan area. SCRAP, an ad hocenvironmental protection group,
alleged that the LC.C.'s decision had been reached without the preparation of the
environmental impact statement required by statute. The group's interest in the
matter was merely that it used the area in question for recreational purposes.
There was no threat to anything which members of SCRAP owned, yet the
Supreme Court held that such detriment as they suffered was sufficient to
constitute "injury in fact". The use of the environment purely for recreation was
an interest which the courts had jurisdiction to protect.
One interesting feature of the case is that the Court was not inhibited by the
indirect nature of both the injury and the remedy awarded. For example, the Court
could not be sure that the quashing of the LC.C.'s decision would alleviate the
grievance of SCRAP; that would be the responsibility of members of the public
who used the area in question. Thus the Court did not require a guarantee that its
intervention would redress the "injury in fact" upon which the standing of the
Group was based. Subsequently, however, the Supreme Court has used the
standing barrier in order to deny a claim where it could not positively be shown
that the relief sought would provide a remedy for the complaint alleged.37
It is also interesting to note that the loss alleged by SCRAP was shared in equal
measure with other members of the community at large, thereby demonstrating
that public values can be the concern of the individual litigant; indeed the case all
but suggests that a "private attorney-general" can maintain an action to vindicate
the public interest. This notwithstanding, it is also arguable that SCRAP is but an
application of the "injury in fact" principle within the framework laid down by the
Supreme Court in the Data Processing case. The concern expressed in the latter
case that the antiquated "legal interest" test prohibited the protection of
non-economic values, itself suggests the propriety of the concern of the members
of SCRAP with the recreational interests which they shared with all other members
33. Dala Processing v. Camp 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
34. Roe v. Wade 93 S.Ct. 705, 714.
35. Allen v. Wrighl104 S.Ct. 3315 (1984).
36.412 U.S. 669 (1973).
37. See, e.g., Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490 (1975), discussed ilifra.
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of the community. However, in spite of the bold liberalization of standing achieved
in SCRAP the courts were initially careful not to erode further the notion of
"injury in fact". For example, in Sie"a Club v. Morton38 an environmental
protection organisation sought, on behalf of its members, to resist the commercial
development of a site of great natural beauty adjacent to the Sequoia National
Park. Without alleging that any of its members had suffered any harm as a result of
the granting of permission to develop that site, the Club asserted that, by its
nature, it had a special interest in the conservation and maintenance of national
parks which would justifY the court in awarding it standing to sue. However, the
Supreme Court held that, since the pleadings did not reveal that any "injury in
fact" had been suffered by the Club's members the action could not proceed in
that form. A Jortiori standing was denied in O'Shea v. Littleton39 where the plaintiffs
based their claim upon the rights of third parties who, they alleged, had been
discriminated against on the grounds of their race and colour in the County's
criminal justice system. The appellants had suffered no harm in their own private
capacity and so the suit could not be maintained. Significantly, the invitation to
treat the exposure of the plaintiffs to the illegal conduct of the defendant, without
any further 'loss', as constituting "injury in fact", was not accepted by the Supreme
Court recently in Allen v. Wn'ght.40 As a result of these "Cases,it is manifest that the
Supreme Court has been prepared to accept any concrete harm suffered in one's
personal capacity as sufficient to generate standing to sue, but that loss suffered by
third parties, or the mere exposure to unlawful conduct without any harm resulting
in one's private capacity, will not suffice. Yet the promise of the Data Processing
case has been fulfilled in so far as the courts will intervene to protect an individual
whose interest in the matter was not purely economic, and thus the kinds of injury
which will suffice for standing purposes would include the aesthetic, recreational
and cultural interests upon which a high value is necessarily placed in a civilized
society.
The Second Limb of the Data Processing Test: the Zone of Interests,
Protected or Regulated
The interpretation placed on Art. 111 by the Supreme Court not only requires the
plaintiff to demonstrate "injury in fact" but also that the interest he seeks to
protect is " ... arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question.,,41 Doubts have been expressed
as to whether or not this provides any workable supplement to the "injury in fact"
limb of the test.42 In the Data Processing case itself, Brennan and White JJ., who
38. 405 U.S. 727 (1973).
39. 414 U.S. 488 (1974).
40. Supra n. 35.
41. Associalion ofDalaProcessingv. Camp 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970).
42. Vining, Legal Identity, p. 104 el seq..
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delivered dissenting opinions as to the imposition of this second limb of the test,
posed the following questions:
"What precisely must a plaintiff do to establish that the interest sought to be
protected ... is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute? How specific an interest must he advance? Will a
broad, general claim, such as a competitive interest suffice, or must he
identifY a specific legally protected interest? When, too, is his interest
'arguably' within the 'zone'? Does a mere allegation that it falls there suffice?
If more than an allegation is required, is the plaintiff required to argue the
merits? And what is the distinction between a 'protected' and a 'regulated'
interest? Is it possible that a plaintiff may challenge agency action under a
statute that unquestionably regulates the interests at stake, but that expressly
excludes the plaintiffs class from the statutory beneficiaries."43
Brennan and White 11 concluded that the standing formula comprised merely
"injury in fact".
The language of the second limb (the zone of interests proteaed or regulated)
suggests that the constitutional guarantee in question must intentionally set out to
protect or regulate the interest advanced by the plaintiff before he can have
standing to sue. Thus, the intention of the legislature in enacting a particular
measure is directly at issue. In the United States this has been criticised as
unsatisfactory and, ultimately, unworkable. A leading commentator44 has stated
that the "statutory beneficiary" inquiry detracts from the central issue, which is
determination of harm for the purpose of invoking the judicial role. If the
individual has suffered such harm, then he will have suffered "injury in fact" and,
by itself, that would satisfY Art. III.
The problems inherent in the notion of the "statutory beneficiary" have been
judicially recognised, and it may be that this limb of the Data Processing test is no
longer regarded as helpful in any standing inquiry. Significantly, in Duke Power v.
Carolina Environmental Stud)' Group45 the Supreme Court established that the
Constitutional requirements for standing were that the appellant should have
suffered "injury in fact" and, additionally, that there should be a causal connection
between the injury alleged to have been suffered and the challenged conduct. One
commentator has observed that the failure even to note the second limb of the
Data Processing test is "as much a reflection of its irrelevance as its desuetude.,,46
It is likely that the second limb of the Data Processing test has been abandoned.
Henceforward, the approach adopted in Duke Power is probably to be regarded as
43.397 U.S. 150, 177.
44. Supra n. 42.
45. 98 S.Ct. 2620 (1978).
46. 92 Ham L. Rev. 253, 261. As Ely states, it is difficult to justify the "zone of interests" limb of the
test since, in constitutional matters such as the due process guarantee, all citizens of the United States
might arguably be within the zone of interests to be protected. This limb of the test is almost
meaningless in such matters.
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authoritative. The plaintiff will have standing if his "injury in fact" is sufficiently
proximate to the challenged conduct.
The Causation Requirement
In a series of cases the Supreme Court appeared to resile from the liberal attitude
that it had adopted in the SCRAP case.47 It had been noted with concern, even in
SCRAP itself, that the Court had been asked to follow "an attenuated line of
causation to the eventual injury",48 quite apart from the fact that the "injury in
fact" rule had been so undermined that "any identifiable trifle" could constitute a
legally cognizable injury.49 As a result, a renewed search for jurisdiction limitation
was begun based upon the concept of remoteness of injury.
In Warth v. Seldin50 it was decided that remoteness involves two related ideas;
first, that the plaintiff must show directness of injury and, secondly, redressibility
of injury in so far as the relief sought will remove the harm of which the plaintiff
complains.51 The directness of injury requirement is a valid one because, in
highlighting the defendant's factual responsibility for the plaintiffs injury, the rule
ensures that the proper defendant is identified in the suit. The redressibility
requirement is thought to emanate from a rule of constitutional law that the court
will have no jurisdiction to pronounce upon the matter if its judgment will not
affect the controversy between the parties. However, it can be argued that those
two requirements have been misapplied or not applied at all.
One issue to be resolved was whether these twin causation requirements would
prohibit the award of standing to a litigant whose injury was only inflicted
indirectly, as, for example, had been the case in SCRAP. 52 As mentioned above,
the members of SCRAP would have had difficulty in establishing that the
possibility of an increase in litter in the environment would be eradicated by the
Court's intervention in that case. Thus a redressibility requirement, strictly
applied, could exclude all claims based upon "injury in fact" inflicted only
indirectly. However, although in Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 53 the Court declined to
award standing to the appellant in these circumstances, a less restrictive attitude
now seems to have gained ground. The redressibility requirement, for example,
can be satisfied if there is a likelihood, 54 or perhaps a substantial likelihood, 55 that
the relief sought will redress the plaintiffs injury. Similarly, the plaintiffs injury
47. Warth v. Seldin 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Linda R.S. v. Richard D. 410 U.S. 614 (1975); Simon v. Eastem
Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization 426 U.S. (1976); and lately, Allen v. Wright 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
48.412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973), per Stewart].
49. Ibid., at p. 689 n. 14.
50. Supra n. 37.
51. Whether the relief sought must, if granted, inevitably redress the injury has been a controversial
matter and is discussed below.
52. Supra n. 32.
53.410 U.S. 614 (1975).
54. AI/err v. Wright, supra n. 47, at p. 3325.
55. Duke Power v. Carolina E,lvirOlmumtal Study Group 438 U.S. 59.
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need only be "fairly traceable" to the defendant's conduct.56 Thus formulated, the
twin causation requirements seem to embrace "injury in fact" inflicted indirectly,
and standing has been awarded in these circumstances notwithstanding the
decision in Linda R.S. v. Richard D.57 Nonetheless, there remains a hesitancy to
award standing in these circumstances and this has deprived some would-be
litigants of access to court. Even in cases in which there has been certainty as to the
standards to be applied, the results seem to defY a coherent exposition.
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organisation58 illustrates the confusion
which clouds the causation issue. Here standing was ostensibly denied because the
plaintiffs could not show directness of injury. The action was brought by a
financially disadvantaged class who sought to challenge a policy of the Internal
Revenue Service which conferred a favourable tax status on hospitals which
treated poor people only in emergency cases. On behalf of the class it was argued
that this policy decision encouraged discrimination in the provision of hospital care
against less well-off citizens in violation of their Constitutional rights.
Standing was denied because the Supreme Court, although apparently paying
lip-service to the notion that standing could be awarded to those suffering only an
indirect injury, rejected the argument that the quashing of the Internal Revenue
Service's policy would remove the incentive to discriminate, thereby providing an
indirect remedy for the injury suffered. This argument was dismissed as being
"speculative".59 However, it is not unreasonable to assume that individuals will
respond to tax incentives; indeed the purpose of granting such an incentive is to
promote the activity in question, and the removal of that incentive, by the same
token, may discourage it. Hence, in contrast to its decision in SCRAP, the
Supreme Court now seemed willing to intervene only where it would be certain
that the granting of relief would alleviate the "injury in fact" upon which the claim
was brought. Normally, this would be in cases of injury inflicted directly. However,
in other cases where the Court seems to have been willing to consider the merits
the causation requirement has been applied in a less rigorous manner, and
standing has been awarded in respect of "injury in fact" inflicted indirectly upon
the plaintiffs.
This was particularly so in Duke Power v. Carolina Environmental Study Group. 60
In this case an environmental protection group challenged the validity of a Federal
statute, the Price-Anderson Act, which limited the amount of damages which
could be recovered against companies licensed to operate nuclear power stations
in the event of a nuclear accident. The Act has been passed in order to make the
development of the nuclear industry more attractive to investors. The group
56. Simoll v. Eastem Kmtudry Welfare Rights Orgallizatioll and AI/m v. Wnghl, supra n. 47.
57. E.g., Duke Power v. Caro/illa ElIVironmmta/ Study Group, supra n. 55, and Regmts of the University of
Califomia v. Bakke, infra n. 61.
58.426 U.S. 26 (1976).
59. Ibid., at pp. 43-44.
60. 98 S. Ct. 2620 (1978).
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alleged that two nuclear plants, which were in the process of being constructed,
would cause low-level radiation, thereby affecting the water temperature and
wildlife in nearby lakes. Had Simon been followed, the group would have had
difficulty in establishing redressibility since it was unlikely that it could
demonstrate that the low level radiation problems were "fairly traceable" to the
Price-Anderson Act. Similarly it would have been difficult to prove that there was
a substantial likelihood that the quashing of the Act would cure those problems.
The nuclear power stations were already partially constructed and, in view of the
substantial commitment of funds already made, it was unlikely that the companies
would dismantle the power stations simply because the limit on liability for nuclear
accidents had been removed.
However, the Court held that the group had standing to sue. Reliance was
placed upon evidence which showed that the companies would not have become
involved in the nuclear industry without the safeguards of the Price-Anderson Act.
The Act was therefore held to have encouraged the growth of the nuclear industry
and it was this which forged the necessary causative link between the "injury in
fact" and the challenged provision. This being so, it is not easy to understand how
in Simon the granting of tax concessions to private hospitals, whose medical fees
excluded poor patients, did not encourage the hospitals to maintain their activities.
The two decisions seem difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile.
However, perhaps the most interesting comparison is that between Warth v.
Seldin 61 and Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.62 In the former case
various litigants challenged a city zoning or planning ordinance which, they
alleged, prevented the construction of cheaper housing in the City of Penfield. It
was argued that this violated the Constitutional rights63 of the poor since the
ordinance would have the effect of denying them access to homes in the City.
However, those litigants who based their challenge on the ground that, enjoying
only a low or moderate income themselves, the ordinance injured them personally,
failed to show that their injury would be redressed by the intervention of the court.
House prices were regulated by market forces which, it was held, were beyond
judicial influence.
However, the market forces argument cannot logically dispose of the case. Just
as house prices may have been the product of market forces, so were incomes, and
it is reasonable to suppose that, in fixing wages, account would have been taken of
the local housing costs. Naturally, those on low or moderate income would then,
presumably, have been able to afford the cheaper property had it been available.
The plaintiffs argument was that such housing was not to be constructed by virtue
of the zoning ordinance, and it was that legislation, and not market forces, which
excluded these litigants from the Penfield area. On the facts, it is therefore argued
61. Supra n. 37.
62.438 U.S. 265 (1978).
63. As well as rights under the Civil Rights Statute 42 U.S.C.S. c.L. 1981-1983.
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that the "substantial likelihood" test for redressibility was satisfied as far as these
litigants were concerned, and that therefore they should have been awarded
standing to sue.
In Bakke's case standing was awarded on legally similar facts. Broadly, a white
male applicant was denied a place at a medical school which, in respect of a
number of its places, discriminated in favour of minority groups. Bakke's academic
record was more distinguished than some admitted under this programme and so
he alleged that his exclusion violated his Constitutional rights. However, he faced
the same difficulty concerning the redressibility requirement that had proved fatal
to the claims in Warth v. Seldin. Even if the Court declared the admissions policy to
be unlawful, Bakke would not necessarily be admitted to the school. Access would
still be regulated by the school itself, just as access to Penfield in Warth v. Seldin
was considered to have depended upon extraneous market forces: both were
outside the control of the court.
The Supreme Court responded by re-examining Bakke's injury. It was held
that, in truth, his injury was the loss of opportunity to compete for all the places in
the school by virtue of the challenged admissions' policy. Of course, had a similar
approach been adopted in Warth v. Seldin some of the plaintiffs might also have
been awarded standing to sue. After all, they had been denied the right to compete
for the more modest property which would have been available in Penfield in the
absence of the zoning ordinance. Arguably these two decisions are also incapable
of reconciliation.
In conclusion, it seems that although the Supreme Court has accepted the
principle that injury inflicted indirectly may be cognizable, the decisions betray an
obvious lack of coherence. The re-definition of Bakke's injury makes a nonsense
of the decision in Warth v. Seldin. This haphazard approach has led to judicial
doubts as to whether the causation principle is not employed merely as a
camouflage for the court's aversion to the plaintiffs claim.64 In considering the
causation issue, the problem no longer seems to be the formulation of an
appropriate test, but rather, in the light of value judgments which appear to have
crept into these recent decisions, of ensuring its consistent application.
This haphazard application of the causation rules, allowing the court to award
standing in some cases, but not in others which are legally indistinguishable,
highlights a continuing, deep-seated, confusion affecting the most basic
jurisdictional issues. Therefore, in spite of the recent attempts to formulate
definitive principles regulating the standing inquiry, the most fundamental
questions seem to remain unresolved: What kinds of dispute are amenable to
judicial settlement? What kinds of grievance entitle an individual to invoke the aid
of the court? Have any new solutions to these questions been postulated?
64. Per Brennan J. (dissenting) in Allen \'. Wright 104 S. Ct. 3315, 3341 (1984).
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The Future of the Injury-Standing Principle
The law is still in a transitional stage and the answers to the above questions have
not been found. Recently, however, there have been signs that possible future
developments in the law of standing may be based upon a radical re-appraisal of
Art. III which might result in the abandonment of the whole "injury-standing"
philosophy. At present this attenuated line of authority is confined to particular
circumstances which are thought to be exceptional and only of limited application.
But if ever an exception were likely to undermine the general rule, these cases
show such a potential since their rationale is precisely that Art. III does not require
the individual litigant necessarily to demonstrate any personal interest in the
outcome of the suit.
It has been stated that Art. III does not, of itself, require that the judicial role be
confined to the settlement of disputes between self-interested parties.65 That is a
limitation which the courts have placed upon themselves, but which has, in the
past, been thought to emanate from An. III. It has been argued that the "cases" or
"controversies" principle merely seeks to entrench the adversarial nature of the
judicial process.66 At the heart of this is the notion that the courts depend
primarily upon full argument provided by the parties. In order that a just
settlement can be reached, each must put forward every view which could be
seriously advanced in support of his own case. This has been dubbed "vigorous
advocacy" by one party of his own rights.67 However, the quality of "vigorous
advocacy", it is now thought, can exist without the plaintiff having any personal
interest in the outcome of the litigation; in other words the plaintiff's challenge
may be based upon third party rights, because the former may be in a position to
advance that cause as effectively as the right-holders themselves. Access to court
then becomes a question of fact namely whether the challenger can advance every
point which might have been made by the right-holders themselves. As will be
indicated, the most important consideration is the 'proximity' of the relationship
between the challenger and the right-holder.
The origins of this view are of respectable antiquity in Federal jurisprudence,
and are echoed even in our own law.68 An early statement in Federal law appears
in Holden v. Hardy,69 in which a State statute prevented employees in the mining
industry from working in excess of eight hours each day. A mine owner argued that
the statute violated the equal protection clause of the Federal Constitution in so far
as it inflicted particular hardship on his employees and removed from them the
right to labour as long as they pleased. The Supreme Court, in doubting his right
to base his challenge upon the loss suffered by third parties, stated: "[His]
65. u.s. Parole Commissioner v. Geraxhly 100 S. Ct. 1202 (1980).
66. This has been accepted for a considerable period. Hitherto, howcver, only thc plaintiffs cognizable
interest guaranteed adversity: Bakerv. Carr 3669 U.S. 186 (1962), and O'Shea v. Liltlelon 414 C.S. 488
(1974).
67. Sec, e.K.• u.s. Parole Commissioner v. GeraKhl)', mpra n. 65.
68. John v. Ras 119691 2 All E.R. 274, 282, per tvlegarry J.
69. 18 S. Ct. 383 (1898).
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argument would certainly come with better grace and greater cogency from his
workers." 70
"Vigorous advocacy" by the mine owner of the rights of the employees was not
likely in this case since they did not enjoy similar interests in the action. Clearly the
de-regulation of the working hours in mines might lead to exploitation of the
miners by the owners, and thus it was likely that the employees would have wished
to resist de-regulation. Hence, the litigation of the third party rights in this case
could not proceed.
However, in u.s. Parole Commissioner v. Geraghty,71 the Supreme Court did
hear an appellant who lacked any interest in the suit in the traditional sense. The
case concerned a prisoner who, whilst still in custody, sought to challenge the
validity of parole release guidelines on behalf of himself and others similarly
affected by them. During the course of the suit however, he was released from
prison, and so lost his personal interest in the suit. It is settled law that he could
have continued to represent the class, in spite of his own lack of a personal interest,
if he obtained a certificate from the District Court that his action was properly
framed.72 This had, however, been denied to him. He wished to appeal against the
ruling of the District Court, but found himself in the impossible position of not
having a cognisable injury in the suit and thus being unable to invoke the aid of the
court even by way of appeal from the denial of certification.
The Supreme Court approached the difficulty by examining again the
fundamental purposes of the Art. III "cases" or "controversies" principle. At one
level the resulting opinion appears to accept the orthodox view that "the
imperatives of a dispute capable of judicial resolution are sharply presented issues
in a concrete factual setting, and self-interested parties vigorously advocating
opposing positions."73 However, in spite of the apparent emphasis placed upon
the need for self-interest as an "imperative" of the court's jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court awarded standing to the plaintiff in this case notwithstanding his
lack of a personal interest in the outcome of the suit.
The crucial finding was that the plaintiff remained a "vigorous advocate" of the
class members' interests who were still affected by the parole guidelines in
question. Whilst "vigorous advocacy" may depend upon the advancement by the
plaintiff of a personal interest in the suit, the notion embraces cases in which a
non-interested litigant appears before the court. The initiative in this case is thus
the divorce of "injury in fact" from the Art. III "cases" or "controversies"
principle where effective advocacy can be provided by other means.
In determining whether a litigant can provide vigorous advocacy when seeking
to litigate third party rights, two considerations seem to assume a greater
70. Ibid .. at p. 390.
71. Supra n. 65.
72. The certificate is available under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. An example of its use appears
in Sosna v. Iowa 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
73. 100 S. Ct. 1202, 1212 (1980).
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importance than all others, and it is these which have allowed the courts to justify
this form of litigation as an exception to the general principles of standing. First,
there must be a close relationship between the litigant and the third party
right-holders; second, the right-holders must find some difficulty in enforcing
their own rights, although, as will be seen, in practice little weight seems to be
attached to this latter principle. Singleton v. Wuljf74 provides a typical illustration of
this type of litigation. Two licensed physicians challenged the constitutional
validity of a statute restricting the availability of abortion treatment under the
Medicaid Programme on the grounds that it violated the Constitutional rights of
their female patients. The Court, finding that the doctor/patient relationship was a
relationship of confidence, and also that women who might otherwise wish to
enforce their own Constitutional rights would encounter problems75which would
inhibit their willingness to come to court, allowed the challenge by the physicians.
Since, it was held, a woman relied upon the doctor to perform any abortion, the
interests of both in this challenge could be regarded almost as synonymous. It was
stated that "there seems little loss in terms of effective advocacy from allowing the
assertion of [the patients' rights] by a physician."76 As was stated in Holdetl v.
Hardy,77 the convergence of interests enjoyed by the right-holders and the
challenger is a necessary safeguard for the former, since the challenger will then
be able zealously to present their mutual interest in the case, and the principle of
res judicata could not then prejudice the right-holders.
Relationships of sufficient mutuality have been held to include that between
teacher/pupil and parent,78 and somewhat controversially, in Carey v. Population
Seroices International,79 between vendor and purchaser in a case which concerned
the regulation of the marketing of contraceptives. If the latter case is a correct
exposition of the law it might not be unreasonable to take the view that the
interests of the environmental protection group and the owners of the land
threatened with pollution in SCRAP converged to the extent that litter pollution
would almost certainly have been opposed by both. It might therefore have been
conceivable that there was no injustice done in hearing only the members of
SCRAP and not the right-holders, since the former could supply the same
74.96 S. Ct. 2868 (1976).
75. The Court identified "mootness" as the first difficulty encountered (see n. 14 supra). Secondly, it
was felt that a woman might be deterred by considerations of privacy. Significantly, the Court admitted
that both of these considerations might easily be overcome. Mootness could be avoided by the
application of the "capable of repetition, yet evading review" principle (n.14 supra); and the litigation'
could proceed anonymously as, e.g., in Roe v. Wade (supra n. 14). Thus, the justification for allowing a
claim by a non-interested party based upon the supposed difficulty that the right-holders would
encounter if enforcing their own rights is somewhat tenuous, and could be regarded as a scarcely veiled
attack upon the general injury-standing principle itself.
76. Single/on v. Wulff, supra n. 74, at p. 2876.
77. Supra n. 69.
78. Pierce v, Society of Sisters 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
79.97 S. Ct. 2010 (1977).
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"vigorous advocacy" as the right-holder themselves if they had instituted
proceedings.
However, in spite of the broadening of the exceptions to the "injury-standing"
philosophy, the Supreme Court in Allen v. Wright80 emphatically resisted its
abandonment. "Injury in fact" suffered by the plaintiff is, it was held, of
"constitutional significance" and necessarily inherent in Art. III since it was the
purpose of that Article to foster the separation of powers within the Constitution.
The judicial branch has no power to decide upon "abstract" issues which fell
within the preserve of the representative branches of the State. The judicial power
was confined to "specific" matters in which each party had an identifiable stake in
the outcome. Doubt has therefore been cast upon the propriety of a
re-interpretation of Art. III based upon Geraghty's case,81 and it is probably
unlikely that any fundamental developments in standing are imminent. However, it
is important to note that where the court is willing to consider the merits, the
matter may well be held to fall within one of the exceptions to the ordinary
standing principles. Although one purportedly rests upon the narrow grounds that
the plaintiff must share a close relationship with the right-holders and that the
latter must have some difficulty in enforcing their own rights, the exception is in
fact very much more expansive than this formulation suggests. Its breadth was
revealed by the Supreme Court when it held that the relationship of vendor and
consumer may fall within its parameters,82 in a decision which goes far beyond
what had hitherto been acceptable. As a result of this case, the precise limits of this
exception category must be in considerable doubt, and its further expansion could,
by itself, threaten the orthodox rules of standing based upon "injury in fact". It is
now arguable that the continued broadening of the categories of relationship
which justifY a departure from the orthodox standing principles, coupled with the
questions surrounding the true rationale of Art. III, may ultimately lead to an
erosion of the injury-standing principle.
Conclusion
The doctrine of locus standi, in its outmoded proprietorial mould, served to exclude
the public spirited litigant who stepped forward to challenge unlawful public action
in a matter in which he had no legally cognizable interest. Consequently, where the
Attorney-General refused to act, the courts were forced to wait upon a challenge
by a member of a possibly small class of those who had suffered the kind of injury
which the court would recognise. Although, perhaps, the greatest incentive to
come to court lay with those affected by the unlawful public action in question,
increasingly, those who have wished to do so have been motivated by reasons other
than the protection of a personal right or interest of their own. However, under the
traditional doctrine of standing, the court has declined to hear the public spirited
80. 104 S. Ct. 3315 (1984).
81. Supra n. 65.
82. Supra n. 79.
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litigant who lacks a recognized interest in the outcome of the suit, no matter how
meritorious the substance of his case.83
In both English law and United States Federal law recent developments have
sought to strike an appropriate balance between instituting an aaio popularis on the
one hand, and enforcing a rigorous doctrine of standing which would inevitably
disqualifY the meritorious but otherwise unqualified litigant on the other. For Lord
Denning the matter was clear: the court should entertain causes brought bona fide
by an individual who could demonstrate a prima facie case that a public authority
had breached its public duty. This was the tenor of his judgment in the
Peachey-Property case,84 and it was a theme which he re-iterated in the Blackburn
cases.85 The House of Lords appears to have been persuaded by the pragmatism
of such an approach in I.R.C. v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small
Businesses Ltd., 86 in which it envisaged circumstances in which a litigant, otherwise
lacking a sufficient interest, might nonetheless have standing to sue.87
Equally, the Supreme Court in the Data Processing case seems to have
recognised the prevalence of the public policy considerations weighing upon the
standing doctrine. It released the doctrine from its proprietorial chains, but
retained the need for the plaintiff to show some detriment in his private capacity. It
continued to expand the categories of person entitled to sue in SCRAP, in which
non-economic values were held to constitute "injury in fact", and standing was
awarded even though the loss was inflicted only indirectly. Data Processing and
SCRAP mark significant progress towards a comprehensive system of administra-
tive law in the United States. It is lamentable, however, that the causation principle
has been employed subsequently in such an arbitrary manner. The suspicion
perhaps cannot be avoided that the denial of standing to litigants such as those in
Warth v. Seldin was predicated upon covert policy reasons which, if disclosed,
would perhaps reveal a judicial aversion to the merits of the plaintiffs case.
Parallel developments in areas generally regarded as justifYing a special
treatment outside the ordinary standing rules continue to indicate the need for a
certain flexibility in the application of the general principle itself. In order to avoid
the inconvenience of the normal rules the Supreme Court has loosened the
confines of the exceptional categories, and has justified its decision to do so by
questioning the long accepted orthodoxy that Art. III entrenches the
injury-standing principle as part of the Federal Constitution. Moreover the
continued broadening of the categories of those entitled to circumvent the "injury
in fact" requirement may cause the eventual atrophy of the injury-standing
83. E.g., Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] A.C. 435.
84. [1966J 1 QB. 380, 400.
85. R. v. Commissioner of Police of the Metropolis [1968] 2 QB. 118; Blackburn v. A/lornry-GeneraJ [19711
1W.L.R. 1037; R. v. Police Commissioner, ex p. Blackburn [1973JQB. 241; R. v. Greater LonMn Council,
ex p. Blackburn [1976] 1 W.L.R. 550.
86. [1982J A.C. 617.
87. Ibid., per Lord Wilberforce at p. 633; Lord Fraser at p. 647; Lord Roskill at p. 662.
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principle. But, even then, there will be a need for jurisdictional limitations; for, as
Lord Denning said in the Peachey Property case,88 a 'busybody' should not be
entitled as of right to invoke the judicial process. Whether or not the United States
courts would be able to hold that such a person could not provide "vigorous
advocacy" has yet to be decided. However, notwithstanding the valuable work
already undertaken by the Supreme Court, when the courts come to examine these
issues the questions to be resolved will be the fundamentally perennial ones:
Which types of dispute are suited to judical resolution? and When is an individual
entitled to invoke the judicial process? These will always remain the raw issues of
the standing question, and perhaps it is not desirable that one solution, fixed for all
time, should ever be realized; for each generation should be free to choose the
values which its society will cherish and to decide how these values will be
protected.
88. Supra n. 84.
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